Simon was dissatisfied with Ribbentrop`s behaviour and stated that such statements were at odds with normal negotiations before leaving the negotiations. A few days later, on 5 June 1935, the British delegation changed its mind. Simon had discussed things with the British cabinet, who thought the deal might be in their best interest, and Simon was ordered to accept Hitler`s offer while it was still on the table. They feared that Hitler would withdraw his offer and embark on the construction of the German navy, which is much higher than its proposed level. Because of the past, Britain knew that Germany could quickly have the same naval capability as it. (d) the German Government supports the issue of maritime armament limitation, the system that divides naval vessels into categories, sets maximum tonnage and/or armament for ships in each category and allocates tonnage to each power per class of vessels. As a result, the German government is prepared to apply the 35% in principle and subject (f) below. the tonnage of each category of vessels to be expected and any change in that report, in a given category or category, to the provisions that may be achieved under a future general sea vessel limitation contract, these provisions based on the principle that any increase in one category would be offset by a corresponding reduction in the other category. If no general maritime restriction treaty is concluded or if the future general treaty does not contain a provision that creates a category restriction, the German government has the right to vary the 35 per cent. The relationship between one or more categories will be established by mutual agreement between the German government and Her Majesty`s Government in the United Kingdom, taking into account the maritime situation that existed at the time. In the end, the Anglo-German naval agreement allowed Germany to build up to 21 cruisers, 64 destroyers, and because of a translation error or mis wording of the agreement, they were allowed to build as many submarines as they wished.
Churchill claimed that the agreement was one-sided and that Britain had essentially agreed to Germany violating the Treaty of Versaille. At a cabinet meeting on 3 May 1939, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Stanhope, stated that “Germany was building ships as quickly as possible at this stage, but would not be able to exceed the quota of 35 per cent until 1942 or 1943.”  Chatfield, now Defence Minister, said Hitler had “convinced” himself that the UK had given the UK a “carte blanche” in Eastern Europe in exchange for the deal.  Chamberlain stated that the United Kingdom had never shown such understanding to Germany, and he noted that, when he met the Fuhrer at the Berchtesgaden Summit in September 1938, he had for the first time been aware of Hitler`s faith in such an unspoken agreement.  In a later document to the cabinet, Chatfield stated that “we could say that we understood now that Mr. Hitler had thought in 1935 that we had given him carte blanche in Central and Eastern Europe, in exchange for his acceptance of the 100:35 report, but since we could not accept the correctness of that opinion, it would be better if the 1935 agreements were annulled.”  Why so much fuss? Shouldn`t Germany`s approval be bowed forever before British naval domination is welcomed with joy by all the friends of peace and all the supporters of the 1919 treaties? Has British maritime domination not been regarded for decades as one of the most important instruments for safeguarding the freedoms of Europe, the most dubious adversary of a nation that plans to place the European continent under its domination? The Anglo-German naval agreement was signed on 18 June 1935 by Germany and Great Britain.